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second Harry Truman administration.
In this work, she soundly establishes
that Eisenhower and Dulles did not
view the communist world as a monolith. In contrast to many American
observers, Eisenhower concluded that
Mao’s control of China was a permanent fact and that U.S. rollback of the
Chinese communist revolution was
unlikely. Like Truman before him, he
disparaged Chinese Nationalist leader
Chiang Kai-shek and his unrealistic
hopes for reestablishing himself on
the mainland. Eisenhower and Dulles
believed that Mao could create his
own path within international communism, following the independent
path of Yugoslavia’s Josip Broz Tito. In
this view they anticipated the possibility of a Sino-Soviet split before it came
to pass. They viewed U.S. economic
sanctions against China as counterproductive, strengthening ties between the
communist-bloc nations. Yet despite
these assessments, Eisenhower continued on a course of confrontation with
China, conducting covert operations
and propaganda against China, tying
Taiwan into a mutual-defense treaty,
and enforcing economic sanctions
against the mainland. Tucker thus faces
the task of explaining an Eisenhower
who “disparaged much of what passed
for China policy under his own administration” yet never publicly expressed or
substantially acted on his convictions.
Eisenhower and Dulles both saw U.S.
interests in Asia as secondary to those
in Europe. Both had strong personal
ties to the European allies and to NATO
and were convinced that Europe was
America’s enduring partner and the
key arena for arresting communist
expansion. Changing U.S.-China policy
carried the probability of significant
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political cost. Because the Republican
Party had made Truman’s “loss of China” a central issue in the 1952 campaign,
moderating the U.S. approach would
have required Eisenhower to challenge
both his own party and the influential
anticommunist “China lobby.” Political capital expended on China policy
would come at the expense of essential
support for European efforts—a cost
Eisenhower was not willing to pay.
In the end, the fact that Eisenhower
and Dulles had a less hard-line view of
U.S. relations with China than is commonly assessed becomes a case study
in the use and limitation of presidential
power. The subtleties of Eisenhower’s
view of Asia pointed to constraints
on his action, real and perceived, and
made the cost of a potential change
in U.S. policy more than Eisenhower
was willing to bear. As Tucker concludes, in the end Eisenhower did not
get the China policy he wanted, but
he did get the China policy he made.
commander dale c. rielage, usn

Strachan, Hew, and Sibylle Scheipers, eds. The
Changing Character of War. New York: Oxford
Univ. Press, 2011. 564pp. $110

Academic strategists have been agonizing over whether war is changing its
character or is being changed by any
manner of influences, ranging from
technology to “war amongst the people,”
since the fall of the Soviet Union. The
tragedy of September 11th added
impetus to this inquiry. The Oxford
Leverhulme Changing Character of
War program, which ran from 2003
to 2009, has been to date the most
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comprehensive attempt to answer the
question. The essays in this work are the
participants’ considered responses to it.
The standout contribution among several extraordinarily useful chapters is Hew
Strachan’s on strategy in the twenty-first
century. Strachan is a historian who,
while aware of his discipline’s fondness
for the particular and aversion to the
general, is concerned to rescue the study
of strategy from political scientists who
tend to use historical examples to justify
sometimes-sweeping theoretical constructs. Historians may be tempted to
dismiss everything as having passed this
way before, which can sometimes cause
failure to recognize genuine change and
innovation. Political scientists, however,
too often are oblivious to the peculiarities of their chosen examples and can
be tempted to see novelty where none
exists. Ironically, both are seeking stability in the service of predictability—the
historian, admittedly, with the skeptic’s
reluctance. Strachan therefore asks,
What can guide us? His answer, not
unexpectedly, is war itself, provided we
maintain a steady focus on the distinction between its nature and its character.
But to what changes in war’s character can the contributors point?
They begin by defining what war is,
in terms of characteristics: fighting;
reciprocity; scale; public, not private;
aims beyond the fighting itself. It is
easy to agree that within these five
pillars war is changing, but exactly
how is harder to pin down and often
amounts to a question of degree.
The historians point to war as a
collective act engaged in by politically, nationally, and ethnically defined
communities. The “philosophers”
point to war’s individualization. In the
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“just-war tradition,” killing is legitimized as part of a collective action, but
under humanitarian law, which now
claims greater and increasing authority, killing is a moral responsibility to
act against inhumane behavior. Consequently, the “what” and “what for”
of law represent a major change, one
in which differences become apparent when the U.S. interpretation of law
as the tool of states is contrasted with
that of those who increasingly view
law as the crystallization of absolute
and internationally agreed norms.
This difference obviously affects attitudes toward not only the suppression
of terrorism but even the issue of who
is a terrorist, as well as the question of
who is, and who is not, a noncombatant.
Osama bin Laden placed the citizens
of all Western nations in his sights on
the basis that democratic mandates
empower governments and do not
simply hold them to account. Yet is
this substantially different from Giulio
Douhet and the other advocates of strategic bombing who argued that civilians
should be bombed to provoke them into
rising up against their governments?
The success of nuclear deterrence
ironically reinforced this trend toward
opaqueness. By making major war
effectively impossible between 1945
and 1990, it opened the door to terrorism and the rise of nonstate actors,
and it led states to channel their use
of violence into limited wars. Such
wars can be robust—think of Russia’s
invasion of Georgia and U.S. action in
Iraq. But limitation and the diversification of players have also sparked talk
of a spectrum of conflict, a concept
that erodes the distinction between
war and peace by viewing peace not
merely as the absence of war but as
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something requiring the provision of
justice, good government, and all that
is necessary to secure human security.
It will come as little surprise that the
majority of essays in this estimable and
thought-provoking volume display
little sympathy for such “new wars”
views. Change has occurred, but the
new wars/old wars argument is between strawmen who do not exist, or if
they did, who survived only for a time
and need to be examined in historical
context. “The wars waged at the start
of the twenty-first century were still
predominantly the products of national, religious and ethnic identity;
their aims remained governance and
state formation. Paradoxically, however,
they have been seen as wars of a new
variety, principally because we have
mistaken the character of individual
wars for war’s normative nature.” “New
wars” often turn out to be “old wars”
coming back to fool us all over again.
martin murphy

Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Foreign
Research Studies
Dalhousie University

Middendorf, J. William, II. Potomac Fever: A
Memoir of Politics and Public Service. Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2011. 213pp. $29.95

Among horses, Potomac fever is a
potentially fatal gastrointestinal disease,
but in the world of American governmental officials it has an entirely
different meaning—although it too can
be a fatal disease. In this case, J. William
Middendorf II refers to the impetus that
led him to leave a successful career as
an investment banker on Wall Street for
Washington, D.C., to become treasurer
of the Republican Party, 1964–68; then
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ambassador to the Netherlands, 1969–
73; Under Secretary and then Secretary of the Navy, 1973–77; permanent
representative to the Organization of
American States, 1981–85; U.S. representative to the European Union,
1985–87; and finally the chairman of
the White House Task Force on Project
Economic Justice, 1985–87. In addition,
Middendorf has been a board member
of the Heritage Foundation and of the
Defense Forum Foundation, as well as
playing continuing key roles as an active supporter of the Navy League, the
Naval Order of the United States, and
many other naval-related activities.
The history of the U.S. Navy’s civilian
administration and its political dimension is a relatively overlooked subject
when compared to its operational history. Moreover, it is rare that a Secretary
of the Navy writes his memoirs, but
when he does they provide invaluable
information, insight, and perspective.
Only a very few of Middendorf ’s predecessors have published their memoirs,
generally figures who served during
key periods, such as John D. Long of
the William McKinley administration
and John Lehman of the Ronald Reagan
administration. Middendorf ’s service
as both under secretary and secretary
linked the last year of Richard Nixon’s
administration with the entire Gerald
Ford administration and provides
valuable insights from that period.
The published works of the two Chiefs
of Naval Operations who served
under Middendorf—Admiral Elmo
Zumwalt, who served his final months
under him and published his memoir
On Watch (1976), and Admiral James
L. Holloway III, who published his
memoir under the title Aircraft Carriers at War (2007)—are significantly
complemented by this book, which
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